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In 1902, Congress passed the Biologics Act. Reenacted in 1944, the Act
remains the primary piece of legislation regulating the use of human biological
products, induding serums, toxins, antitoxins, vaccines, and blood and blood
products. Although the Act gives the Bureau of Biologics (as it is currently
known) complete power to regulate these products, it never answers the cen-
tral question whether FDA approval of vaccines immunizes their manufacturers
from tort liability. Since the amount of liability a vaccine company faces di-
rectly eects its willingness to develop and market such products, the answer
to this question will eect millions of lives. Furthermore, this issue will only
become more hotly contested in the future as AIDS vaccines, whose side eects
cannot fully be known, are developed. A summary of the landmark decision,
Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories (1974), will provide an interesting platform from
which to launch a discussion of this important subject.
In Reyes the fth circuit expanded the scope of liability for manufactur-
ers of human vaccines. In May, 1970, the plainti in that case, Anita Reyes,
had become paralyzed after having been fed by eye-dropper oral polio vaccine
manufactured by the defendant drug company. The Court began its opinion
by dividing human vaccines into two categories{those unreasonably dangerous
per se and those unreasonably dangerous as marketed.' Marketing of a vaccine
in the former group was totally prohibited because, in the court's opinion, the
product was not net socially benecial. A vaccine in the latter group, however,
could be marketed as long as accompanied by a proper warning of the possible
side eects of using the drug.
Believing that the polio vaccine in question clearly belonged in the second
group (the chance of contracting polio from an attempted immunization was one
in a million), the Court proceeded to question the suciency of the defendant's
warning. Since the plainti had received the drug from a public health nurse at
a
2local clinic, the Court determined that the vaccine was not administered as a
prescription drug. As a result, the normal working rule that a drug manufacturer
owes a duty to warn of any possible dangers inherent in use of its products only
to the prescribing physician was found inapplicable to the present situation.
The Reyes court then followed the rule of an earlier case, Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories
399 F.2d 121, in ~~'hich the ninth circuit held that absent the intervention of
an individualized medical judgment between the manufacturer of a prescription
drug and the ultimate consumer, it is the responsibility of the manufacturer
to see that warnings reach the consumer, either by giving warning itself or by
obligating the purchaser to give warning. Although the defendant in the Reyes
case had included a package circular with every vial of its vaccine, the Court
found this warning insucient to provide notice to the vaccinees of the dangers
posed by use of the drug. The Court further noted that the defendant could
not take advantage of the prescription drug exception to escape from liability
since it was clearly foreseeable to the manufacturer that its vaccine could be
administered by a public nurse in a local clinic without any physician present.
In fact, a Wyeth representative had testied during the trial that it was com-
mon knowledge among vaccine manufacturers that their drugs were dispensed
in this manner.
After the jury determined that the polio vaccine caused the plainti's injury,
the burden shifted to the defendant to rebut the presumption that a warning
would have changed the plaintis decision to take the vaccine, thus preventing
the injury. In judging this question, the Court resorted to an objective standard
by asking if the reasonable defendant would have made a dierent decision if
presented with the proper safety information. The Court concluded that Wyeth
failed to meet its burden citing as justication for this judgment the
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manufacturer's failure to inform the plainti of a way to reduce the risk
posed by use of its vaccine.
The driving force behind the Court's opinion was its belief that vaccinees
have a liberty interest at stake, which it dened as the right of the individual
to choose and control what risk he will take. Sometimes, the Court conceded,
the countervailing societal and individual interest will be so overwhelming that
the manufacturer will not be required to provide sucient information for the
vaccinee to make an informed judgment. But in the present case, the Court
maintained, the possible injury resulting from use of defendant's vaccine was
serious enough that the individual could rationally have refused it. In other
words, the individual had a true choice judgment that the manufacturer should
have respected.
The Court then concluded by dismissing arguments made by the defendant.
To the defendant's complaint that an eective warning would have to be so scien-
tic and detailed that it would deter people from seeking innoculation against
polio, the Court conclusorily stated that a policy of warning plaintis of the
risks inherent in vaccination could be compatible with a public policy favoring
innoculation. The Court was somewhat more solicitous of the drug company's
argument that Texas's requirement that all of its schoolchildren receive immu-
nization against polio rendered the warnings irrelevant. But the Court also
rejected this argument. Although the children may not avoid innoculation,
the Court reasoned, they still may choose the method of receiving it. In this
case, the court noted that the plainti could have opted for innoculation from
killed-virus Salk vaccine in lieu of the oral polio vaccine manufactured by the
defendant.
Although it is easy to sympathize with the outcome of Reyes the decision is
seriously awed by the court's failure to debate, let alone justify, its institutional
competence to decide issues of drug law. Admittedly, courts rarely do question
419
their competence to hear a case but, as scientic knowledge progresses, it
seems they should. More importantly, the Reyes court never debates the merits
of imposing liability on a manufacturer whose product and warning had been
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Since the Court fails
to note the Agency's role, the typical reader, unaware that all biologics must
receive such approval prior to marketing and distribution, can be forgiven for be-
lieving that the Court had reined in a greedy, socially unconcerned corporation.
Unfortunately, the reality was otherwise.
Although Wyeth Laboratories had complied in good faith with all relevant
federal regulations in a highiy-regulated industry, the Reyes court aorded the
vaccinee even greater protection. The decision eectively placed on vaccine
manufacturers the burden of proving that warnings contained on their vaccines
are both necessary and appropriate. And, even if a company is particularly
prudent in performing its duties and holds its products to an even higher safety
standard than that mandated by the FDA, the Reyes decision allows a court to
hold it to a still higher one.
There are many reasons, some ideological and some political, that can ex-
plain Congress's refusal to statutorily overturn the Reyes decision until twelve
years after it was decided. Its failure to do so was possibly a tacit acceptance
of the Court's view that the FDA, and all government agencies for that matter,
sometimes make decisions that cause injury. Allowing recourse to the court
system protects the public from the occasional failures of these administrative
agencies. (Of course, it is not readily apparent why manufacturers should pay for
mistakes made by organs of the government). It is also possible that Congress
let the Reyes decision stand because it believed that manufacturers should in-
sure individuals against injuries resulting from use of their vaccines. Under this
view,
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it is not relevant whether the FDA determined the negligence standard prop-
erly since defendants are held strictly liable for their actions.
Alternatively, Congress's decision to allow tort liability for manufacturers
possibly evidenced a desire to avoid blame for its role in harming the plainti.
After all, Congress as represented by the FDA could have taken measures to
prevent the plainti's injury. It could have required the warning demanded
by the Reves court prior to the injury. Or it could have required an even more
stringent one. Or it could never have approved the vaccine in the rst place. The
public, however, probably viewed the Reyes decision as a moral condemnation
of the defendant. The Court's decision provided Congress as represented by the
FDA with at least a partial shield against public criticism.
Regardless of the motive underlying Congress s refusal to immediately over-
turn Reyes the decision had disastrous consequences for the drug industry and,
inevitably, for the health of the American public. By permitting a court to
blame the drug manufacturer instead of the FDA, Congress never asked whether
anyone should be blamed for injuries that result from use of FDA-approved vac-
cines. Obviously, moral and economic arguments can be made on both sides
of the question. Certainly, a drug manufacturer and the government can assert
with some degree of conviction that if a FDA-approved vaccine is accompanied
by an FDA-approved label, then an individual choosing to use the vaccine as-
sumes the risk. An individual seeking protection against these injuries, they
can argue, should self-insure.
Many scholars criticize this view. They argue that a healthy individual,
injured by use of a drug company's product, should be made whole by a mone-
tary award. But this argument rests on a false conception of health. Although
an individual may outwardly appear healthy, that individual's future is fraught
with risk. All individuals carry within them a potential, albeit an
6extremely small one in most cases, for contracting almost any disease. When
an individual chooses to inoculate himself or herself against one of these poten-
tials, he or she is merely trading risks. That the government or industry should
pay when individuals gamble and lose is not the clearcut proposition that ad-
herents of liability contend.
The argument against insurance does become a bit more complicated when
government mandates innoculation. Even then, however, it can be justied by
the strong public policy of preventing the spread of infectious illnesses. The
individual is forced to relinquish control over the level of risk he or she would
choose, but, people are asked to make sacrices for the good of society every
day. Obvious examples are a progressive income tax and use of all taxpayers'
money to fund public education, despite the reality that many citizens benet
only indirectly from government provision of this service.
Admittedly, compromise in pursuit of the public interest seems more dicult
when it involves forcing an individual to take an action that may cost him his
life. Society, however, is continually making compromises that lead to loss of
life. Permitting automobile drivers to travel at a speed of 55 miles per hour
and allowing people over the age of twenty-one to drink alcohol provide two
examples of this proposition. Studies clearly have shown that slower driving
and less drinking lead to fewer deaths and injuries. Yet there is no movement
towards making these changes. In fact, just the opposite is true. Obviously,
society has decided that, at some point, human life is not worth saving. Beyond
some level of inconvenience and expense, we are all unwilling to compromise in
the interest of preserving life.
In the realm of biologics, compromise should seem easier. Unlike the driving
and drinking examples above, where lives are balanced against convenience and
cost, the debate concerning tort liability for vaccine
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manufacturers weighs lives against other lives. So a sacrice that costs lives
also save lives. Instead of taking comfort in those saved, however, we focus on the
resulting deaths even though they are invariably fewer in number. Somehow,
random but denite deaths today seem far worse than random but denite
deaths tomorrow. Also, vaccine-related fatalities seem bizarre and carry with
them an aura of malpractice whereas those resulting from disease seem natural
and inevitable. Unfortunately, our intellect is limited by our inability to view
the world statistically. Unlike a death caused by disease, we can pinpoint the
cause of a vaccine-related injury. In our despair at this death, we strike out
at the vaccine's manufacturer, seemingly forgetting the lives saved by the very
same product.
The previous discussion, of course, is purely academic. One must never
forget that the FDA, like all other government institutions, can maintain its
legitimacy only so long as its decisions are ratied by society. So even if it seems
rational that the FDA approve all vaccines that are net socially benecial, they
certainly will not. Although a particular vaccine might save 50 lives, the FDA
probably would not approve it if it would cause 45 deaths. Similarly, even if
the logic underpinning insurance for vaccine victims is at best questionnable, it
will be provided. Current societal values demand no less. In this light, the real
questions are how much insurance and who will pay for this insurance.
The debate about how much insurance to provide is in reality nothing more
than the age-old debate concerning the proper standard of liability. In recent
years, however, the traditional debate between strict liability and negligence has
been completely undermined. It is now commonly recognized that the dierence
between these standards is merely one of degree, not kind. As negligence is
dened in broader terms, it becomes increasingly dicult to distinguish it from
8strict liability. In the modem era, therefore, we are no longer presented with
a choice between negligence or strict liability, but between more or less liability.
Proponents of higher liability argue that increasing the exposure of vaccine
manufacturers will give these companies incentive to make their products safer.
The less in damages awards that these companies pay, the argument continues,
the lower the prices they will charge for their drugs and the larger their market
share will be. Unfortunately, this argument fails if the initial increase in the
price of the drug results in its removal from the market. This may happen if
its manufacturers are unable to approximate the amount of tort damages they
will have to pay and, accordingly, are uncertain at what price to set the vaccine.
Alternatively, the drug may remain on the market but its price may be so high
that only the wealthiest or those with the best health care plans will be able to
aord it. If the need for the drug is strong enough, then the public will demand
that government subsidize its use. In the end, there will be little substantive
dierence between an insurance system funded by the drug industry and one
paid for by the government.
In response to this argument, critics often assert that the prots of drug
companies are so great that even if they are forced to assume liability for all
injuries caused by their vaccines, they surely can aord this additional cost of
doing business. But these critics miss a basic point. Private drug companies still
may be able to attain a prot, possibly even a handsome one, by producing a
vaccine for whose harmful eects they will bear liability. But will they produce
such a vaccine? Instead these companies may choose to improve the products
they presently produce. Or maybe they will decide to develop drugs in areas
presenting less risk than that of biologics. A large drug company or its owner
may even choose to expand into other industries in which the potential prots
are greater.
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intelligent mix of protection for the vaccinee and incentive for the manufacturer.
A standard chosen that is too favorable to either interest will result in a higher
number of deaths than necessary. Furthermore, the FDA is certainly the orga-
nization best suited to setting such a standard. One of the primary rationales
of administrative law is the desirability and necessity of having judges with the
proper expertise making the decisions in areas of great complexity. If this ra-
tionale justies the legal functions of all of the departments of the executive
branch, it applies with special force in the area of biologics.
It truly seems doubtful that a courtroom judge possesses the experience
to understand the careful policy compromises engaged in by the FDA every
time it approves a warning label attached to a vaccine. Similarly, it is equally
unlikely that a judge has the background necessary to understand the scientic
studies that contribute to an FDA decision to approve a vaccine. The FDA's
Bureau of Biologics, on the other hand, has a special tradition of employing
accomplished scientists dating back to the period when the Bureau was a division
within the National Institutes of Health (NlH). In this light, it seems highly
improbable that a judge is as well equipped as an FDA ocial to make an
intelligent compromise between the safety of biologics and the deterrence of
their manufacturers.
Of course, an argument that the FDA should have sole jurisdiction over
liability in the biologics area is not tantamount to a belief that the agency is
perfect. Clearly, the FDA, like all other bureaucracies, may be inecient in
certain respects. With only about eight thousand workers nationwide and a
limited budget, it cannot be as responsive as some citizens would like. But
the overcrowded court system does not provide a solution to any of the FDA's
problems. Since a court can only operate after a case or controversy has arisen,
it is limited even if its judges somehow have the knowledge necessary to render
an intelligent decision.
10I
Unlike the determinations of a federal administrative agency, court decisions
cannot provide notice to a manufacturer that will enable it to make informed
business decisions. And, if these companies face uncertain liability in tort, they
will be less willing to assume risk. Correspondingly, the development of much-
needed drugs will be impeded.
There are still more reasons to defer to the FDA in the biologics area. With
one administrative agency making all decisions concerning negligence, like cases
are more likely to be treated in the same manner. Uniformity of decision-
making is less likely when decisions are made by judges possessing dierent
levels of knowledge sitting in dierent circuits. In addition, the FDA has ample
statutory authority to insure that the standards it requires are met. It not only
can inspect any lot of vaccine it chooses, but also can inspect at all reasonable
hours any manufacturing plant. Furthermore, the reputation it has earned,
especially when compared to other federal agencies like HUD and the EPA,
shows that its standards have gained acceptance by the public. And, if the
FDA does begin to make mistakes, public criticism and congressional inquiries
will assuredly provide ample impetus for its improvement.
Once the FDA has set the standard for a vaccine, a company failing to
meet this standard will be guilty of negligence. Any insurance beyond this
level should be paid for by the government. In fact, since the Reyes decision,
Congress itself has opted for this solution. In 1976, Congress passed the Swine
Flu Act. This Act allowed a cause of action for all injuries and death resulting
from innoculation with swine vaccine only against the United States. Under
the statute, the cause of action could be brought on a theory of strict liability,
negligence, or breach of warranty. The government could recoup its losses to
individual plaintis by bringing suit against the manufacturer of the vaccine
but only if that manufacturer was negligent or breached its contract with the
United States by failing to meet the
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FDA standards. The government agreed to provide this insurance not nec-
essarily because it subscribed to the view that manufacturers should be shielded
from tort liability but because it had no choice. These companies, unable to
obtain insurance for the swine u vaccine, simply refused to produce the swine
u vaccine unless the government gave them this guarantee.
Similarly, Congress passed the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of
1986 to encourage reluctant companies to develop and market child vaccines.
Like the Swine Flu Act, the 1986 legislation, which overruled the Reyes de-
cision, reduced the potential liability exposure of vaccine manufacturers. The
Act created an insurance system to compensate all victims of the covered vac-
cines, irregardless of any negligence on the part of a manufacturer. To fund
the program, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987,
which levied an excise tax on all sales of the vaccines. Under the system, if a
vaccine injures a child in a specied manner, and the government cannot rebut
the presumption that the vaccine caused the injury, the plainti receives com-
pensation (assuming certain time requirements are met). If unsatised with his
or her recovery from the fund, the plainti is allowed to sue the manufacturer.
The company, however, can only be held liable if its products fell below the
FDA-approved standards or if it knowingly had deceived the Agency.
Which of the above solutions to the problem of manufacturer liability is
superior? It all depends on the circumstances. If a manufacturer is willing to
sell a vaccine despite the addition of an excise tax, then a system similar to the
one enacted by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act seems better. After
all, such a system is less costly to the government since it does not pay for the
insurance scheme. If, on the other hand, the excise tax imposed on the sales of
a particular vaccine is large enough to deter the manufacturer from developing
and marketing it, then a system similar to the one enacted by the Swine Flu
Act should be tried.
12Unless sale of a particular vaccine presents little chance of signicant tort
liability for a manufacturer, however, both solutions seem better than the one
provided by the Reyes court. If designed correctly, neither of these insurance
systems will provide too much disincentive to product innovation. And both
provide at least a partial answer to critics who believe that strict tort liability
is necessary in the event the FDA fails. Although neither system punishes
the vaccine manufacturers, they do provide coverage for their victims. Most
importantly, though, both provide manufacturers with notice of their liability
exposure.
Nevertheless, these systems have many detractors. The two most common
criticisms of government-managed insurance is its cost (only applicable to the
swine u system) and a fear that its provision will impact negatively on industry
behavior. Concerning the former complaint, opponents of large government
will argue that these programs are too costly. In an age of large decits, they
maintain, we simply cannot aord to provide such an insurance fund. They seem
to forget, however, that vaccines have and will continue to prevent thousands of
disabling injuries. It is surely better for the government to soak up the costs of
vaccine development now than to pay expensive medical bills later. And, this
fear of huge future costs is not ill-founded considering that millions of Americans
have no health insurance and millions more have only minimal coverage.
With regard to the second complaint, proponents of tort liability believe that
companies will take advantage of this insurance by not making their products
safer even when doing so is possible at minimal cost. Knowing that government
will pay for all injuries caused by their vaccines or that their liability will be
limited to the cost of an excise tax, the argument continues, these companies
will have no incentive to continually improve their products.
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There are several responses to this argument. In the rst place, contrary
to popular opinion, executives of drug companies cannot all be evil people,
completely oblivious to the public's welfare. Certainly, there must be some ex-
ecutives who occasionally make decisions that are not prot-maximizing. More
importantly, though, even if the government insures a company's vaccines, that
company still will not want to develop a reputation for making drugs that harm
people. Consumer groups and the like will help keep these companies honest.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the knowledgeable scientists employed by the
FDA in its Bureau of Biologics would be less aware of existing ways to improve
a vaccine's safety than the scientists employed by the vaccine's manufacturer.
Finally, if one still fears that the vaccine industry will run amok if shielded
from tort liability, an incentive system can be created that rewards companies
for taking extra steps in the interest of safety. The tax system provides an
instrument for such a system. If the number of injuries caused by a vaccine
exceeds its manufacturer's share of the particular market, that manufacturer
can be required to pay slightly higher taxes. These taxes will go directly into
the government fund created for that vaccine's victims. On the other hand,
companies that sell a vaccine that causes fewer injuries than would be expected
based on the company's market share will receive a tax rebate. This system
should have a positive inuence on the behavior of vaccine manufacturers.
In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that this paper has been written
with future vaccines in mind. It is true, of course, that most vaccines currently
available are extremely safe and not prohibitively expensive. For the few injuries
caused by these vaccines, an insurance system paid for by their manufacturers
might be feasible and reasonable. The small increase in a manufacturer's cost
of doing business could be oset by a similarly small increase in the price of the
particular vaccine. Disincentive to create new vaccines would be minimal. But
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vaccines of the future may only become this safe if government insures them
during their earliest stages of development. In this light, a government-paid
system may be a necessary bridge between the riskier and safer periods of a
vaccine's life.
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